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Unemployment Dynamics and the Cost of Business Cycles
*
 
In this paper, we investigate whether business cycles can imply sizable effects on average 
unemployment. First, using a reduced-form model of the labor market, we show that job 
finding rate fluctuations generate intrinsically a non-linear effect on unemployment: positive 
shocks reduce unemployment less than negative shocks increase it. For the observed 
process of the job finding rate in the US economy, this intrinsic asymmetry is enough to 
generate substantial welfare implications. This result also holds when we allow the job finding 
rate to be endogenous, provided the structural model is able to reproduce the volatility of the 
job finding rate. Moreover, the matching model embeds other non-linearities which alter the 
average job finding rate and so the business cycle cost. 
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In a very famous and controversial article, Lucas (1987) argues that the costs of business cycles
are negligible: using empirically plausible values for risk aversion, he shows that individuals
would only sacri¯ce a mere 0.008% of their consumption to get rid of all aggregate variability in
consumption. This leads him to argue that further improvements in stabilization policies are not
the priority. This claim is completely at odds with the neoclassical synthesis and the Keynesian
legacies, but also with conventional wisdom. In subjective data studies, aggregate unemployment
volatility undermines the household's perceived well-being (Wolfers (2003)). Survey data also
suggest substantial bene¯ts from improved stabilization policies (Shiller (1997)).
In this paper, we investigate whether the e®ects of business cycles on average consumption can
imply sizable welfare costs. Business cycles may a®ect average consumption if aggregate shocks
a®ect the economy asymmetrically: the consumption losses during recessions could outweigh
the gains during economic booms. This implies the existence of some non-linearities in the
propagation of business cycle shocks : the process of alternate expansions and contractions
could lead in itself to a lower average consumption. On the other hand, shocks hitting the
economy are assumed to be symmetric, even if there are no reasons to think they have to be,
but it is more satisfactory to explain the asymmetry as the result of the economic structure. It
is the propagation mechanism that explains the asymmetry and not the impulsion itself.
Our objective in this paper is to show that the matching unemployment theory embodies strong
non-linearities which may change our view of business cycles. First, the unemployment dynamics
depend non-linearly on the job ¯nding and the job separation rates. Secondly, the canonical
matching approach also predicts that the job ¯nding rate depends itself in a non-linear way on
the shocks hitting the fundamentals of the economic structure like productivity shocks. This
paper aims to show that these non linearities lead to sizable welfare costs which have been
surprisingly ignored despite numerous studies of the matching labor market approach.
Following Cole and Rogerson (1999), our analysis is ¯rstly based on the reduced form of the
matching model where the job ¯nding and separation rates are considered as exogenous stochas-
tic processes. The use of a reduced form model has the advantage of making our results robust to
several changes to the standard matching model and of easily unveiling the asymmetric impact
of job ¯nding and separation rate °uctuations on unemployment. During booms, the increase in
the job ¯nding rate is partly o®set by the decrease in unemployment. In recessions, the decrease
in the job ¯nding rate is ampli¯ed by the increase in unemployment. Because of this asym-
metry, average unemployment is increased by °uctuations in the job ¯nding rate. Conversely,
°uctuations in the job separation rate lower the average unemployment rate1. We show that
1During booms, the decrease in the job separation rate is ampli¯ed by the increase in employment. In recessions,
the increase in the job separation rate is compensated by the decrease in employment.these asymmetries explain why the volatility and the persistence of the job ¯nding and sepa-
ration rate processes are potentially key variables in the analysis of business cycle costs. More
surprisingly, we ¯nd that the welfare costs of °uctuations also depend on the structural level of
unemployment. Economies in which the steady state unemployment rate is high are economies
su®ering from high costs of °uctuations. For the observed process of the job ¯nding rate in the
US economy, we show that the asymmetry quantitatively matters and generates sizable business
cycle costs. Conversely, the observed volatility of the separation rate is too small for this non
linearity to manifest: the volatility of the job separation rate has virtually no impact on average
unemployment.
However, the reduced form analysis gives a correct estimate of the costs of °uctuations only if
stabilization does not have any e®ect on the average job ¯nding rate. Indeed, in the reduced
form model, we assume that the counterfactual stabilized job ¯nding rate is equal to the average
job ¯nding rate. But what if °uctuations also modify the average job ¯nding rate? A structural
model is then necessary to take into account how the shocks hitting the fundamentals of the
economy a®ect the job ¯nding rate. We consider a canonical matching model with aggregate
productivity shocks. This model naturally predicts that the job ¯nding rate is a concave function
of the vacancy-unemployment ratio. This could imply that °uctuations decrease the average job
¯nding rate. But as the vacancy-unemployment ratio is a convex function of productivity, the
impact of productivity °uctuations on the average job ¯nding rate is a priori ambiguous.
A prerequisite for quantifying these di®erent e®ects is that the structural model needs to match
the observed characteristics of the job ¯nding rate. Since Shimer (2005), it is well known that the
standard matching model fails to generate realistic °uctuations in the job ¯nding rate. Produc-
tivity shocks cause strong movements in wages that o®set the ¯rm's incentive to change hiring,
thus dampening the variations in the job ¯nding rate. With such a mechanism, the welfare cost
of °uctuation nearly disappears. Hall (2005) and Hall and Milgrom (2008) show that including
wage rigidities can help the model to match the volatility of the job ¯nding rate. This modi¯-
cation increases the sensitivity of the model to productivity shocks, but at the expense of the
observed °exibility in wages Pissarides (2007). Other routes have been followed to elucidate the
Shimer puzzle. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) show that a higher parametrization for the util-
ity of being unemployed and a lower bargaining power for workers enable the standard matching
model to yield realistic °uctuations in the unemployment rate. Whereas Hornstein and Violante
(2007) introduce investment-speci¯c technological shocks, Kennan (2006) emphasizes the role of
procyclical informational rents: the gain that ¯rms obtain by being more informed than workers
increases in booms. The inclusion of turnover costs (Pissarides (2007), Mortensen and Nagy-
pal (2003) and Silva and Toledo (2008)) and match-speci¯c technological change (Costain and
Reiter (2008)) have also been investigated.
We show, in the simple framework with wage rigidities proposed by Hall (2005), that the non-
2linearities embedded into the matching model may cause the business cycles to in°uence the
average job ¯nding rate. This framework allows us both to generate enough job ¯nding rate
volatility and to focus only on the basic non-linearity due to the matching function. It then
appears that the matching elasticity to vacancy plays a crucial role in the size of the business cycle
costs. The internal mechanisms of the matching model lead to quite strong additional business
cycle costs when the vacancy elasticity of the matching function is su±ciently low. Considering
a version of the matching model with °exible wages and ¯xed hiring costs (Pissarides (2007))
allows us to generalize this property and to show that the type of non-linearities is naturally
dependent on the structural model. Di®erent approaches to solving the Shimer puzzle potentially
lead to di®erent stabilized job ¯nding rates, and imply therefore di®erent evaluations of the cost
of business cycles.
All in all, these results challenge Lucas's controversial result on business cycle costs by explor-
ing an original mechanism. The literature following Lucas (1987) has mostly focused on the
consequences of business cycles on the volatility of individual consumption. More precisely, be-
cause business cycles amplify individual income risks, they could generate higher welfare losses
than Lucas's predictions when ¯nancial markets are incomplete. However, in as far as individ-
ual income °uctuations are transitory, the costs of business cycle are still low, even negligible
Krusell and Smith (1999), mainly because consumption can be smoothed through capital ac-
cumulation. On the other hand, when individual income variations are permanent, and then
non self-insurable, the cost of business cycles becomes substantial (Beaudry and Pages (1999),
Krebs (2007)). In the literature, very few papers focus on the consequences of business cycles
on average consumption. This idea has been sketched out by De Long and Summers (1988);
they argue that rather than steadying economic activity at its average level, stabilization would
prevent output from deviating from its potential level. Ramey and Ramey (1993) explore this
mechanism in a model where ¯rm have to pre-commit to a speci¯c technology before start-
ing production. In this context, stabilization enhances welfare by increasing the e±ciency of
production. Stabilization may also increase welfare through its e®ect on capital accumulation
(Matheron and Maury (2000) and Epaulard and Pommeret (2003)). Barlevy (2004) shows that
the business cycle costs become sizable when returns to investment are decreasing. Eliminating
°uctuations reallocates investment from periods where the marginal return to investment is low
to periods where this return is high, and therefore leads to a higher growth rate of consumption.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we use a reduced form of the matching
model to investigate the consequences of the non-linearity in the unemployment dynamics. Given
the observed processes of the job separation and ¯nding rates, we then derive its implication for
the costs of business cycles. The third section takes into account the non-linearity in the job
¯nding rate dynamics embodied into the matching model. The last section concludes.
32 Asymmetry in the unemployment dynamics: a reduced form
approach
We believe that labor market frictions naturally generate asymmetries in the unemployment
dynamics. Because of these asymmetries, aggregate °uctuations may have an impact on average
unemployment. We ¯rst present our theoretical framework, and then analyze the unemployment
dynamics. Finally, a quantitative evaluation of the business cycle costs is proposed.
2.1 Framework
Following Cole and Rogerson (1999), our theoretical framework is based on the reduced form
of the matching model. We consider unemployment dynamics as the result of exogenous job
separation and job ¯nding °uctuations. By shutting down any non linearities that may a®ect
the job ¯nding and separation rates, the reduced form model allows us to focus on the non
linearity embedded in the unemployment dynamics. Moreover, in order to isolate the e®ect of
the labor market non-linearities on the business cycle costs, we eliminate any non-linearities in
the relationship between employment and production on the one hand and between production
and consumption on the other hand.
Unemployment. The unemployment dynamics arise from the entries to and exits from em-
ployment. The former are determined by the job ¯nding rate p, the latter by the separation rate
s.
ut+1 = st(1 ¡ ut) + (1 ¡ pt)ut (1)
Shocks. The economy is hit only by aggregate shocks which generate some °uctuations in the
job ¯nding rate pt and in the separation rate st. The job ¯nding rate and separation rate are
exogenous with respect to ut. This key assumption derives from the matching theory. The
aggregate shocks a®ect linearly2 both the job ¯nding rate and the separation rate which are
assumed to follow an AR(1) process:
pt = (1 ¡ ½p)¹ p + ½ppt¡1 + "
p
t (2)
st = (1 ¡ ½s)¹ s + ½sst¡1 + "s
t (3)
The shocks "p and "s have a zero-mean and a standard deviation equal to ¾"p and ¾"s respectively.
¹ p and ¹ s denote the average job ¯nding rate and the average separation rate respectively.
Preferences. Workers are assumed to be risk-neutral. This assumption allows us to focus
on the e®ects of business cycles on average consumption. We ignore the welfare cost induced
2We assume symmetrical shocks in order to identify the endogenous asymmetries generated by equation (1).
We show in Appendix D that our results are not sensitive to this hypothesis.
4by individual and aggregate consumption volatilities. Moreover, we choose to consider that
the disutilities of working and of not working are both equal3 to the same value Â. It is then





Production. Labor is the only factor of production. How employment variations lead to
variations in aggregate production depends on the assumptions made on the returns to scale
or the market structure between the ¯nal and intermediate goods. In order to isolate the
impact of the labor market non-linearities, we choose an aggregate production function linear
in employment y(1 ¡ ut) with y the average labor productivity, considered as constant in this
reduced form analysis4.
Consumption. Agents consume all their income5. Aggregate consumption is therefore equal
to:
ct = y(1 ¡ ut)
There are no savings in our economy. This simplifying assumption is not restrictive as our results
do not rely on the impossibility of individuals to smooth their income. As agents are risk-neutral,
the excessive volatility of consumption implied by this assumption is not captured in the welfare
calculations. The focus is here on the impact of business cycles on average consumption, which
is not a®ected by smoothing behaviors.
The welfare cost of °uctuations. Following Lucas (1987), we compute the welfare cost of
°uctuations as the cost of being in an economy hit by aggregate shocks, rather than being in
an economy without aggregate shocks. In the former economy, the job ¯nding rate and the
separation rate °uctuate around their means, whereas in the latter they are set forever at their
average value ¹ p and ¹ s. The welfare cost of business cycles ¸ is de¯ned as the percentage of









3The existence of a signi¯cant gap is quite controversial. There are not only job search costs in the disutility
of not working, but also indirect costs such as psychological damage and skill obsolescence. Does it compensate
for home production and the disutility of working? There are no clear empirical answers. We follow here the
traditional approach in matching models which identi¯es the return to non-market activity with unemployment
bene¯ts. This view is consistent with the fact we consider that non employed people are supposed to search and
are not specialized in home production as non participating individuals are.
4In the structural approach (Section 3), productivity will be stochastic and will drive all the aggregate series
in the model.
5It is not necessary to present the income received by unemployed and employed workers respectively as there
are no implications here. See the next section for an explicit presentation.
5where ¹ c is the level of consumption in the economy without aggregate shocks. It must be empha-
sized that ¹ c does not necessarily coincide with the mean of consumption in the volatile economy.
This was the case in Lucas's approach. When °uctuations may alter the mean of aggregates, ¹ c
can no longer be measured by its mean. It needs to be derived from a counterfactual experiment
based on an arti¯cial economy without any shocks. Following here the convention in the litera-
ture, we will qualify this economy as the stabilized economy. The stabilized unemployment (or
the structural unemployment) and the stabilized consumption are then equal to:
¹ u =
¹ s
¹ s + ¹ p
and ¹ c = y(1 ¡ ¹ u)
How the stabilized economy is reached is not explicitly presented, especially nothing is said on
the design and the e±ciency of stabilization policies. It can be argued that the business cycle
cost gives an upper bound of the bene¯ts of stabilization policies.
Finally, our theoretical framework allows us to provide a straightforward cost of the employment
°uctuations in terms of welfare. The measure of the business cycle costs is a pure measure of
the employment reduction caused by °uctuations.
2.2 The analysis of the non-linearities in the unemployment dynamics
By considering equation (1), it is fairly intuitive that shocks on the job ¯nding rate (¢pt ´ ¹ p¡pt)
and on the separation rate (¢st ´ ¹ s¡st) have non linear e®ects on unemployment. Let us rewrite
the unemployment dynamics in deviation to the steady state unemployment (¢ut ´ ut ¡ ¹ u):
¢ut+1 = (1 ¡ ¹ s ¡ ¹ p)¢ut | {z }
propagation





The way shocks on the job ¯nding and separation rates are propagated is symmetric between
expansions and recessions. By contrast, the impact of these shocks depends on the level of
unemployment. As unemployment is higher during a recession, the job ¯nding rate shocks have
a greater impact in recession; the decline in the job ¯nding rate is magni¯ed by the increase in
unemployment. On the contrary, during booms, the decline in unemployment o®sets the increase
in the job ¯nding rate. As a result, °uctuations in the job ¯nding rate tend to increase average
unemployment. The asymmetry stems from the di®erence in unemployment (or equivalently,
in employment) between recessions and booms. The greater the di®erence, the greater the
asymmetry: the standard deviation of the shocks is a key factor of the business cycle cost.
Furthermore, the longer are booms and recessions, the greater are these e®ect: at the extreme
limit, the increase in the job ¯nding rate would be no longer operative if the expansion made
unemployment disappear. During booms, the °ows out of unemployment are weaker and weaker.
The persistence of the shocks is another key factor of the business cycle costs.
6Conversely, as the impact of the job separation rate shocks depends on the level of employment,
the °uctuations in the separation rate lead unemployment to decrease more in booms than to in-
crease in recession: °uctuations in the job separation rate tend to reduce average unemployment.
Again, the volatility and the persistence of these shocks are key factors.
In this section, we assess precisely these di®erent e®ects. First, as it is traditionally done in the
matching approach with aggregate shocks (see for instance Hall (2005)), a steady state analysis
of equation (1) is conducted and so °uctuations in the conditional steady states are considered.
This analysis delivers very easily the basics of the non-linearity embedded in the unemployment
°uctuations. This simple framework highlights the importance of the volatility of the job ¯nding
and separation rates for the size of business cycle costs, but also the less expected role played
by the structural unemployment rate. Secondly, taking into account the inertia embedded in
equation (1), we derive the full non-linear properties of the unemployment dynamics and show
that the persistence of the aggregate shocks also matters.
2.2.1 Steady state analysis
Let us assume for now that the speed of convergence of unemployment is in¯nite: °uctuations
cause unemployment to jump directly from one conditional steady state to another. A condi-
tional steady state unemployment corresponds to the level e ui toward which the unemployment
rate would converge if the separation and job ¯nding rates forever keep the same value pi and si,
i.e. if the economy remains in the same state i. Let us de¯ne ¼i the unconditional probability
of being in state i. The value taken by p and s in each state i and the probability associated
¼i de¯ne the Markov chains associated with p and s, consistently with equations (2) and (3).
The average job ¯nding rate ¹ p is therefore equal to
P
i ¼ipi and the average separation rate ¹ s
to
P
i ¼isi. Jointly, they determine the structural unemployment rate ¹ u. On the other hand, as
unemployment is assumed to jump directly from one conditional steady state to another, the






The non-linearity embodied in equation (1) implies that average unemployment ~ u has no reason
to coincide with structural (stabilized) unemployment ¹ u.
Job ¯nding rate shocks
To understand the speci¯c role of the non linearity in job ¯ndings, let us assume ¯rst that the
separation rate is constant and equal to its mean ¹ s. This non-linearity implies that e ui is a convex
function of the state-dependent job ¯nding rate pi:
e ui =
¹ s
¹ s + pi
(4)
7Because unemployment is a convex function of the job ¯nding rate, the average unemployment
is higher than the structural (stabilized) unemployment ¹ u, i.e. the unemployment level in the
counterfactual economy where the job ¯nding rate is forever set at its mean ¹ p:
¹ u =
¹ s
¹ s + ¹ p




The convexity in the impact of the job ¯nding rate on unemployment implies a higher average
unemployment rate in an economy with a volatile job ¯nding rate than in the stabilized economy.
Figure 1 illustrates this result with a simple numerical example. Let us consider that the job
¯nding rate can take only two values pL = 0:3 or pH = 0:6. For a job destruction rate of 3.5%,
unemployment °uctuates between the two conditional steady states e uL = 10:4% and e uH = 5:5%.
If the two states are equiprobable, unemployment is on average 8% in this volatile economy;
largely above the stabilized economy unemployment rate. If the job ¯nding rate was steady
at ¹ p = 0:45, unemployment would be equal to 7.2%. In this stylized example, business cycles
increase unemployment by 0.8 percentage point.
Figure 1: Convexity in steady state unemployment
 
It is fairly intuitive that the gap between average unemploymente u and stabilized unemploy-
ment ¹ u depends on the unconditional variance ¾2
p of the job ¯nding rate. For uniformly small
deviations, using a second order Taylor expansion of equation (4), this gap can be written as 6:
~ u ¡ ¹ u ¼
¹ s
(¹ s + ¹ p)3¾2
p (5)
A mean-preserving increase in the volatility leads to a larger di®erence between the stabilized
and °uctuating economies. The more volatile the economy, the greater the business cycle cost.
Figure 2 illustrates how the variance of aggregate shocks a®ects the gap between e u and ¹ u in
the simple case where the job ¯nding rate can only take two values : pL = 0:25 or pH = 0:65.
In this con¯guration, the average unemployment rate in the volatile economy exceeds that of
6See Appendix A for the derivation.
8Figure 2: The role of volatility
 
the stabilized economy by 1.5 percentage point (vs 0.8 percentage point in the casepL = 0:30/
pH = 0:60).
Figure 3: The role of the average job ¯nding rate
 
Equation (5) indicates that the unemployment gap also depends on the mean of the job ¯nding
rate and of the separation rate. A lower value of ¹ p or a higher value of ¹ s imply a more convex
economy. This result is important as it generates strong interactions between structural and
cyclical unemployment. Furthermore, this suggests that labor market institutions a®ect the wel-
fare costs of °uctuations as they have an impact on the average job ¯nding and separation rates.
Figure 3 displays how the structural job ¯nding rate modi¯es the consequences of °uctuations
on average unemployment.
Job separation rate shocks
So far, the separation rate was assumed to be constant. However, it appears clearly from equation
9(1) that the asymmetry in the unemployment dynamics could also come from °uctuations in
the separation rate. The resulting unemployment gap would then read:
e u ¡ ¹ u ¼ ¡
¹ p
(¹ s + ¹ p)3¾2
s (6)
with ¾2
s the unconditional variance of the separation rate. Contrary to the job ¯nding rate
case, °uctuations in the separation rate tend to reduce average unemployment. Job separations
decrease more in expansion than they increase in recessions. As shown by equation (6), the
unemployment gap depends on the average job ¯nding and separation rate. An increase in
either of these variables weakens the impact of °uctuations on average unemployment. Further,
the asymmetry embodied in equation (1) translates into average unemployment only if the
separation rate is volatile enough.







Figure 4 illustrates this result with a simple numerical example. Let us consider that the
separation rate can take only two values sL = 0:023 or sH = 0:046, which correspond to a
standard deviation of the same relative magnitude as the job ¯nding example. For a job ¯nding
rate of 45%, unemployment °uctuates between the two conditional steady states e uH = 9:46%
and e uL = 4:86%. If the two states are equiprobable, unemployment is on average 7.16% in this
volatile economy, below the stabilized economy unemployment rate. If the job separation rate
was steady at ¹ s = 0:035, unemployment would be equal to 7.22%. In this stylized example,
business cycles decrease unemployment by 0.05 of a percentage point. It is remarkable7 that the
same standard deviation of roughly 33% for the job ¯nding and separation rates leads to a very
di®erent magnitude for the absolute level of the unemployment gap e u ¡ ¹ u.
7We will investigate this point further in the quantitative section.
102.2.2 Considering unemployment inertia
All previous calculations have been made with the assumption that unemployment jumps directly
to the conditional steady states. Under this assumption, average unemployment in the business
cycle economy is equal to the average of the steady states ~ u. This equality is no longer valid once
we take into account unemployment inertia. Let us explore the implications of this inertia in the
case where unemployment °uctuations are caused only by job ¯nding rate shocks8. Combining
equation (1) and (4), the dynamics of unemployment can be rewritten:
ut+1 = ut + (¹ s + pi)(e ui ¡ ut) (7)
Contrary to the previous section, unemployment does not jump to its conditional steady states ;
it converges toward the level e ui at rate ¹ s+pi. Because of unemployment inertia, the asymmetry
embodied in the conditional steady state does not necessarily manifest in average unemploy-
ment. This asymmetry a®ects the average unemployment rate only if the aggregate shocks are
persistent enough.
An illustration. Let us illustrate this intuition by considering again the numerical example
of section 2.2.1. The job ¯nding rate can take two values pL = 0:3 or pH = 0:6. Figure 5
shows the adjustment path of unemployment from its stabilized level towards its respective
conditional steady states uL = 10:4% and uH = 5:5%. As shown in the right hand side of Figure
5, the dynamics of unemployment are identical in the ¯rst periods following the shock. The
di®erence between recession and expansion arises only if either lasts long enough. The additional
unemployment caused by business cycles depends not only on the mean and the volatility of
the aggregate shocks, but also on their persistence. We also expect some interactions between
the level of asymmetry and persistence. The higher the variance of shocks, the greater the
consequence of persistence9.
Some analytical results. To see in a synthetic formula the role of the mean, the volatil-
ity and the persistence of aggregate shocks, let us solve equation (1). We compute average
unemployment in the case where only the job ¯nding rate is °uctuating. Rewrite simply the
unemployment dynamics in the following way:
ut+1 = ¹ s + Átut
8The analysis is similar in the case where the job separation rate is °uctuating.
9Note that the asymmetry in the convergence rate ampli¯es the role of persistence. As pointed out by Cole and
Rogerson (1999), the rate at which unemployment converges toward its conditional steady states depends on the
aggregate state. The rate of convergence toward its conditional steady state e ui is equal to ¹ s+pi. Unemployment
in the volatile economy is "biased" toward favorable aggregate states as the speed of adjustment is higher in those
sates.
11Figure 5: The role of persistence



























Recession: Conditional steady state
Expansion: dynamics
Expansion: Conditional steady state








































Recession: Conditional steady state
Expansion: dynamics
Expansion: Conditional steady state
where Át ´ 1¡ ¹ s¡pt and E[Á] ´ ¹ Á = 1¡ ¹ s¡ ¹ p. The autoregressive process de¯ned by equation
(2) implies that Át follows an autoregressive stationary process:
Át = ½pÁt¡1 + (1 ¡ ½p)¹ Á ¡ "
p
t
A backward substitution gives:











As shown in Appendix B, the additional unemployment created by business cycles can then be
approximated by 10:








(1 ¡ ¹ s ¡ ¹ p)k¡2
k¡1 X
i=0





The di®erence between average and stabilized unemployment depends on the exogenous volatility
of p and on the propagation of these shocks which in turn results from the exogenous persistence
½p and the unemployment inertia. If pt and hence Át were not serially correlated (½p = 0), °uctu-
ations in the job ¯nding rate would not a®ect average unemployment. Average unemployment in
the business cycles and in the stabilized economy would be identical: E[u] = ¹ u. When aggregate
shocks are persistent, average unemployment in the business cycle economy is no longer equal
to stabilized unemployment. Volatility then matters: the greater the variance of job ¯nding rate
shocks, the higher the unemployment rate. In line with our intuition, equation (8) also shows
10The approximation consists of neglecting moments of order above 2. This is line with our approach : as we
want to understand how symmetrical shocks can yield non symmetrical e®ects on unemployment, we disregard
in particular the consequences of non-zero skewness
12some interactions between the volatility, the persistence and the mean of the job ¯nding rate.
An increase in the variance of the shocks raises average unemployment all the more so when
the average job ¯nding rate is low and the persistence of the shocks is high. The magnitude
of business cycle costs will then depend on the observed characteristics of the job ¯nding rate
shocks. Business cycle costs also depend on the average separation rate : like the persistence and
the mean of the job ¯nding rate, the level of the separation rate can amplify the costs generated
by job ¯nding rate °uctuations.
Symmetrically, in the case where only the separation rate is °uctuating, we have a welfare gain
of °uctuation which positively depends on the volatility and on the persistence of the separation
rate11:















¹ s(1 ¡ ¹ s ¡ ¹ p)k¡2
k¡1 X
i=0




Again, the average job separation and ¯nding rates interact with the volatility and the persis-
tence of the shocks.
2.3 Quantifying the welfare cost of business cycles
To investigate whether observed °uctuations in the job ¯nding and separation rates a®ect aver-
age unemployment and hence the costs of business cycles, it is necessary to estimate the AR(1)
processes12 described by equations (2) and (3). As equations (8) and (9) give only an approxi-
mation of average unemployment, we resort to simulations to obtain a more accurate estimate
of the costs of business cycles. Consistently with the AR(1) estimations, we simulate job ¯nd-
ing and separation shocks in order to obtain arti¯cial series for the job ¯nding and separation
rates13. We then use them to simulate equation (1), which allows us to compute the average
unemployment rate in the business cycle economy and the business cycle costs.
2.3.1 Data
The behavior of job ¯nding and job separation rates over the business cycle is still a debated
subject. It especially depends on the underlying conception of \unemployment". Contrary to
Shimer (2005) who computes the job ¯nding rate from standard unemployment, Hall (2005)
uses a measure of unemployment expanded to include "discouraged workers" and "marginally
attached workers". Although those workers are classi¯ed as being out of the labor force, their
behavior is close to that of workers classi¯ed as unemployed. Indeed, there are signi¯cant worker
11We checked numerically that the di®erence in the brackets is positive.
12It must be emphasized that considering a log-normal distribution for p and s would have led to very similar
results. See Appendix D for more details.
13We checked that all values of p and s are in the interval [0,1].
13°ows directly from out of the labor force to employment: Blanchard and Diamond (1990) suggest
that a fraction of people classi¯ed as being out of the labor force do search for a job, though
probably less intensively than unemployed workers. Cole and Rogerson (1999) argue that a
model with only two labor market states (employed and unemployed) must be calibrated with
care, using data including people who can be in a third labor market state (not in the labor
force). Taking into account, as Hall (2005) does, the transitions from being not in the labor
force to employment seems to be a reasonable way of dealing with this issue. Moreover, this
approach seems particularly relevant in an analysis of the business cycle costs. Although our
benchmark result is based on Hall's data, we also provide the results obtained when Shimer's
approach is used.
The job ¯nding rate
The Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005) measures of the job ¯nding rate both exhibit pro-cyclicality.
The job ¯nding rate plunges at each recession and recovers at each expansion (Figures 7 and
8, Appendix C). Both measures show a downward trend in the 1970s and in the early 1980s.
As some of these movements could be due to factors unrelated to business cycles, we primarily
focus hereafter on series detrended by a low frequency ¯lter14. However, note that two elements
call for not detrending the data. First, the downward trend does not necessarily result from non
cyclical factors ; it could also be explained by the increase in the frequency of recessions observed
during the 1970s. Secondly, as the mechanism studied in this paper relies on non linearities, the
method used to isolate the cyclical component of the job ¯nding rate could a®ect the welfare
cost of °uctuations. This is why non detrended (raw) data are also considered hereafter.
Table 1: Job ¯nding rate statistics
Hall data Shimer data
Raw Detrended Raw Detrended
Mean ¹ p 0.285 0.450
Standard deviation ¾p 0.084 0.069 0.068 0.053
Autocorrelation 0.942 0.913 0.939 0.915
Note: Quarterly average of monthly data. Sample covers 1948q3-2004q3
for Hall (2005) and 1951q1-2003q4 for Shimer (2005). Following Shimer
(2005), both sets of data are detrended with a HP smoothing parameter
of 105.
We then estimate the parameters characterizing the process of the job ¯nding rate as described
by equation (2). As expected, the \expanded job ¯nding rate" has a lower mean than Shimer
(2005)'s measure (Table 1). As shown in the previous section, this may exacerbate the asymme-
try in the unemployment dynamics and induce larger business cycles costs. More importantly,
14As in Shimer (2005), we used a Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter with smoothing parameter 10
5.
14including low intensive job seekers also implies a higher variability15. Hall (2005)'s measure
should therefore lead to a higher cost of business cycles. On the other hand, these ¯gures are
quite sensitive to the use or not of the HP ¯lter.
The job separation rate
The discrepancy between Shimer's and Hall's measures of the separation rate is also noteworthy.
Hall (2005) computes a series for the overall separation rate (which includes layo®s, quits, end
of short-term contracts) from gross °ows on separations. By contrast, Shimer (2005) focuses
only on transitions from employment to unemployment. He infers the job separation rate from
short term unemployment. As for the job ¯nding rate, Hall's measure includes worker °ows
between employment and not being in the labor force. Although both series capture the NBER
dated recessions quite well, their trends are completely opposed (Figures 9 and 10, Appendix
C). Furthermore, Hall's job separation rate is 10 times less volatile than Shimer's for a similar
persistence (Table 2).
Table 2: Job separation rate statistics
Hall data Shimer data
Raw Detrended Raw Detrended
Mean ¹ s 0.031 0.034
Standard deviation ¾s £10¡2 0.058 0.029 0.540 0.260
Autocorrelation 0.970 0.872 0.946 0.756
Note: Quarterly average of monthly data. Sample covers 1948q3-2004q3 for
Hall (2005) and 1951q1-2003q4 for Shimer (2005). Following Shimer (2005),
both sets of data are detrended with a HP smoothing parameter of 105.
2.3.2 Business cycle costs with only job ¯nding shocks
Figure 6 illustrates the asymmetry in the unemployment °uctuations relative to the stabilized
economy for a particular simulation of equation (1) corresponding to a particular draw in the
estimated process of the job ¯nding rate. Positive shocks on the job ¯nding rate reduce unem-
ployment less than negative shocks increase it. Therefore average unemployment in the business
cycle economy (dashed line) is above the unemployment rate in the stabilized economy (solid
line).
Table 3 presents the welfare cost of business cycles in the US economy for the four measures
of the job ¯nding rate. Non-linearities in the unemployment dynamics are enough to generate
sizable costs of business cycles. In particular, these costs are between one and two orders of
magnitude greater than the costs found by Lucas (1987). The method chosen to measure the
15Table 1 shows the standard deviation of the job ¯nding rate, and not of its innovation.
15Figure 6: Asymmetry in the unemployment dynamics, Hall data, detrended









































































Hall data Shimer data
Raw Detrended Raw Detrended
Unemployment 10.50% 10.22% 7.14% 7.08%
Stabilized unemployment 9.83% 9.83% 7.00% 7.00%
Cost of °uctuations 0.74% 0.44% 0.13% 0.08%
job ¯nding rate has strong consequences on the welfare costs of °uctuations. When some non-
employed job seekers (Hall's method) are taken into account, °uctuations in the job ¯nding
rate induce at least a 0.44% consumption loss. This cost increases to 0.74% if all job ¯nding
rate °uctuations are related to business cycles factors. As expected, Shimer's measure leads
to lower business cycle costs: if the job ¯nding rate is computed using only transitions from
unemployment, the welfare cost of business cycles reduces to 0.08%. Such a result was expected
as Shimer's job ¯nding rate series display both a lower volatility and a higher mean (Table 1),
two characteristics that we identi¯ed as cost-reducing.
As Table 4 shows, consistently with equation (8), volatility plays a crucial role in this result. The
gap between the results inferred from the Shimer and Hall data comes mainly from di®erences in
volatility. Considering a lower average job ¯nding rate16 for a relatively low volatility modi¯es
only marginally the magnitude of the business cycle costs (0.10% versus 0.08%). The same
16A lower average job ¯nding rate implicitly increases the relative volatility of the job ¯nding rate. To under-
stand the speci¯c role of the mean of the job ¯nding rate, we ensure that its relative volatility is held constant.
We modify the standard deviation of the shocks to maintain the coe±cient of variation constant.
16Table 4: Understanding the "Hall-Shimer wedge", detrended data
From Shimer data ¹ p,¾p,¹ s,½p ¹ p,¹ s,½p ¾p,¹ s,½p ¹ p,¾p,½p ¹ p,¾p,¹ s;0:98
From Hall data ¹ p,¾p,¹ s,½p ¾p ¹ p ¹ s ¹ p,¾p,¹ s;0:98
Unemployment 7.08 % 10.22% 7.33% 10.71% 6.53% 10.33% 7.08%
Stabilized unemployment 7.00% 9.83% 7.00% 10.62% 6.46% 9.83% 7.00%
Cost of °uctuations 0.08% 0.44% 0.35% 0.10% 0.07% 0.56% 0.09%
Notes: This table shows the welfare cost of °uctuations for job ¯nding rate processes that share characteristics from both
Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005) data. For instance, column 3 presents the same average job ¯nding and separation rates
and the same autocorrelation as Shimer (2005) but the same dispersion (measured by the coe±cient of variation) as Hall
(2005). In column 4, we modify the variance of the shocks to ensure that the relative volatility (again measured by the
coe±cient of variation) of the job ¯nding rate is held constant. Regarding the persistence experiment (columns 7 and 8),
the variance of the shocks has been to modi¯ed to maintain the unconditional variance of the job ¯nding rate constant.
statement can be made when a di®erent value for s is considered for a given volatility (0.07%
versus 0.08%). On the other hand, if Shimer's job ¯nding rate was characterized by a higher
level of volatility (equal to Hall's data)17, the corresponding cost of °uctuations would amount
to 0.35% which is signi¯cantly di®erent from 0.08%. However, it is also signi¯cantly di®erent
from the 0.44% cost induced from Hall's data. The remaining di®erence is due to the in°uence
of the average value of the job ¯nding rate and of the separation rate. The in°uence of the
structural unemployment then depends on the level of the volatility: the higher the latter, the
higher the in°uence of ¹ p and ¹ s. This result reveals signi¯cant interactions between structural and
cyclical unemployment18. A higher structural unemployment rate ampli¯es the welfare cost of
business cycles when the volatility in unemployment is high. This result suggests that business
cycles could reduce average consumption by more in continental European countries19 which
would then su®er from both higher structural unemployment and more costly unemployment
°uctuations.
When we consider an arbitrarily higher persistence20 (½ equal to 0.98), the cost of business
cycles is higher for both Hall's and Shimer's measure, but the increase is greater when volatility
and structural unemployment are higher. An increase in the persistence of shocks reinforces the
asymmetry in the unemployment process, especially when volatility is high.
These results bring new insights to the analysis of the welfare costs of °uctuations. Business cycle
costs mainly depend on the variability of aggregate shocks, but the three characteristics of the
17We focus here on the relative volatility of the job ¯nding rate, measured by the coe±cient of variation.
18That higher unemployment is caused by a higher separation rate or a lower job ¯nding rate in°uences the
cost of °uctuations only marginally.
19To the best of our knowledge, job ¯nding rate data for European countries do not go back enough to infer
their cyclical properties. Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) have constructed series for France and Spain, but these
series start respectively in 1991 and in 1987. However, all empirical evidence points to a lower average job ¯nding
rate in Europe.
20The variance of the shock has been to modi¯ed to maintain the overall variance of the job ¯nding rate constant
17job ¯nding rate process deeply interact. The marginal e®ect of volatility crucially depends on the
mean and on the persistence of the job ¯nding rate, but also on the value of the separation rate.
Furthermore, this suggests that labor market institutions have an impact on the welfare costs of
business cycles, not only because they a®ect the amount of volatility faced by individuals (with
unemployment bene¯ts for example), but also because they a®ect structural unemployment.
Overall, these ¯rst results put into question the optimism of Lucas (1987) about the weakness
of business cycle costs. They are obtained in a very simple framework without taking into
account the individual risks associated with aggregate unemployment, which has received more
attention in the literature since the seminal work of Krusell and Smith (1999). Unemployment
°uctuations could then imply welfare costs through both a decrease in aggregate consumption
and an increase in individual consumption volatility. There are no reason to think that these
two dimensions are not cumulative21, leading to substantial business cycle costs.
2.3.3 Business cycle costs with job separation shocks
If shocks on the job ¯nding rate lead to business cycle costs, those on the separation rate
could imply business cycle gains. Let us simulate equation (1) with job separation shocks, ¯rst
without job ¯nding rate shocks, secondly with those shocks and taking into account the co-
variance between the two. We again consider both Shimer's and Hall's data. Whatever the data
considered, the consumption gains brought by these °uctuations are negligible. They are even
nil considering Hall's data which display so little volatility in the separation rate. We show in
Table 5 the results relative to Shimer's data. Even in this case, the volatility is not enough to
generate strong asymmetries in the unemployment dynamics: the business cycle gains are of the
same magnitude as the business cycle costs shown by Lucas (1987).
Table 5: The welfare cost of °uctuations in the separation rate
no shock on p two correlated shocks
Raw Detrended Raw Detrended
Unemployment 6.99% 7.00% 7.16% 7.10%
Stabilized unemployment 7.00% 7.00% 7.00% 7.00%
Cost of °uctuations -0.009% 0.00% 0.18% 0.10%
Note: The two ¯rst columns show the welfare cost of °uctuations in the case where
only the separation rate °uctuates. Columns 3 and 4 give the consequences of the
co-variance between the job ¯nding rate and the separation rate. These results
are computed using Shimer (2005)'s data for which the covariance is ¡1:6:10¡4
(¡0:8:10¡4) for raw (detrended) data.
Note that this does not necessarily imply that the volatility of the separation rate does not
21The veri¯cation of this assertion is left to further research.
18signi¯cantly contribute to the volatility of the unemployment rate. Considering Shimer's data,
Fujita and Ramey (2008) estimate that °uctuations in the separation rate account for at least
28% of the unemployment volatility. Even if the volatility in the job separations represents a
signi¯cant proportion of the unemployment °uctuations in the business cycle, it fails to decrease
average unemployment signi¯cantly22.
However, if their speci¯c role is limited, job separation shocks can interact with job ¯nding ones.
Taking into account its covariance with the job ¯nding rate may enhance the consequences of
job ¯nding rate °uctuations. If the separation rate is negatively correlated to the job ¯nding
rate, movements in the separation rate cause the unemployment rate to increase further during
recessions and decrease further during booms. This ampli¯es the asymmetry in job creation
between periods of boom and recession. During booms, the increase in the job ¯nding rate is all
the more o®set as the separation rate ampli¯es the decline in unemployment. During recessions,
the increase in the separation rate enhances the magnifying e®ect of the rise in unemployment.
A negative correlation between the job ¯nding rate and the job separation rate in the cycle could
lead to exacerbate the costs induced by the job ¯nding volatility.
We then simulate equation (1) taking into account both shocks and the observed negative cor-
relation (equal to -0.48 and -0.59 in the raw and detrended cases respectively) between them
(only for Shimer (2005)'s data). The last two columns of Table 5, compared to those of Table
3, show how this negative correlation ampli¯es the welfare consequences of the job ¯nding rate
volatility. The welfare cost of °uctuations increases from 0.08% to 0.10% when considering HP
¯ltered data, and from 0.13% to 0.18% when the data are not ¯ltered. However, as this e®ect
modi¯es only marginally the costs induced directly by the volatility in the job ¯nding rate, we
choose to disregard the °uctuations in the separation rate in the rest of the paper.
3 Endogenizing the job ¯nding rate: a structural approach
The previous section showed that the observed volatility and persistence in the job ¯nding
rate lead to sizable costs of business cycles. The structural matching model is a candidate for
generating such costs. However, Shimer (2005) shows that the standard matching model fails
22We indeed perform here a di®erent exercise. In the variance decomposition, the variances are weighted
by parameters which compensate for the di®erence in level between s and p. In our investigation of business
cycle costs, the levels matter. Let us consider equations (5) and (6) as these simpli¯ed expressions are a good
approximation of the business cycle costs when the processes of p and of s are highly serially correlated as in
data. They show that the di®erence in the order of magnitude of the volatility of p and s is not compensated for
by the coe±cients which pre-multiply the variance in each equation. This is an intrinsic limitation to the impact
of separation shocks on business cycle costs. It explains why the observed volatility of the separation rate is too
small for this non linearity to manifest: the volatility of the job separation rate has no real impact on average
unemployment.
19to generate realistic °uctuations in the job ¯nding rate. The standard deviation of the job
¯nding rate is 12 times greater in the data than in the model (Shimer (2005)). An increase in
labor productivity increases the expected pro¯t from a ¯lled job, and thus ¯rms tend to open
more vacancies. But there are internal forces in this framework which partially o®set the initial
increase in expected pro¯ts and then dampen the incentives for vacancy creations. Replicating
the job ¯nding rate °uctuations is then not easy.
There already exist in the literature di®erent approaches which solve the Shimer puzzle23. Do
we care about identifying the mechanism at the origin of the high °uctuations in the job ¯nding
rate? From the analysis conducted in the ¯rst part, it could be tempting to say that it is enough
to know that at least one theory is able to replicate the job ¯nding rate dynamics. Actually, we
do care. Indeed, the results obtained in the ¯rst part are derived from a model in which the job
¯nding rate is exogenous, and in which °uctuations are neutral regarding the average job ¯nding
rate. To assess the welfare costs of °uctuations, one must take into account the consequences
of stabilization on the average job ¯nding rate. If productivity shocks and the job ¯nding rate
are linearly related, the results found in the previous section should a priori be close to the
endogenous job ¯nding rate case. But if not, the average job ¯nding rate can then be a®ected
by business cycles. Why do we suspect the presence of a non-linear e®ect of business cycles on
the job ¯nding rate? The job ¯nding rate is a non-linear function of the labor market tightness
which also depends non-linearly on productivity changes. To show and quantify these di®erent
e®ects, a structural model is then required to generate a counterfactual stabilized economy. In
this case, the costs of business cycles could di®er according to the model speci¯cation.
The choice of the theoretical model is then potentially crucial. The studies aiming at elucidating
the Shimer puzzle emphasize di®erent mechanisms and none seems to close the debate. We
choose to study the business cycle cost implied by the wage rigidity approach as suggested
initially by Hall in a ¯rst response to the puzzle. This framework ¯ts perfectly well with our
objectives: it allows us to generate enough volatility in the job ¯nding rate, but also to reveal,
in a very transparent way, the basic non-linearity embodied in the matching model. As the
wage retroaction is neutralized in the job creation condition, it allows us to focus only on the
implications of the basic non-linearity introduced by the matching function, independently of
other assumptions (hiring and/or separation costs, insider/outsider wages). We then present
di®erent calibrations of the matching function elasticity in order to unveil these implications.
Each replicates the job ¯nding rate process (standard deviation and mean)24. The implied
business cycle costs are not necessarily identical and equal to that obtained in the ¯rst part.
23See for instance Hall (2005), Hall and Milgrom (2008), Pissarides (2007), Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008),
Hornstein and Violante (2007), Kennan (2006), Mortensen and Nagypal (2003), Silva and Toledo (2008) and
Costain and Reiter (2008)
24The persistence would be naturally matched by that of productivity shocks.
203.1 A canonical matching model
The model considered hereafter is a version of the matching model µ a la Pissarides with ag-
gregate uncertainty and exogenous separation. The economy includes the basic assumptions
of the framework presented in the previous section. Agents are risk neutral, without access
to ¯nancial markets and can either be employed or unemployed. An unemployed worker gets
an unemployment bene¯t z. Employed workers receive wage w until their job is destroyed (at
rate s); we do not take into account on-the-job search and voluntary quits. Output per unit of
labor is denoted by yt and is assumed to follow a ¯rst-order Markov process according to some
distribution G(y;y0) = Pr(yt+1 · y0jyt = y). Jobs and workers meet pairwise at a Poisson rate
M(u;v), where M(u;v) stands for the °ows of matches and v the number of vacancies. This
function is assumed to be strictly increasing and concave, exhibiting constant returns to scale,
and satisfying M(0;v) = M(u;0) = 0. Under these assumptions, unemployed workers ¯nd a job
with a probability p(µ) = M(u;v)=u that depends on the ratio of vacancies to unemployment
(µ = v=u). The probability of ¯lling a vacancy is given by q(µ) = M(u;v)=v. Hereafter, we
impose that the matching function is Cobb-Douglas: M(u;v) = 'u1¡®v® with 0 < ® < 1.
The unemployment dynamics in the economy (equation (10)) are similar to equation (1), except
that the job ¯nding rate is now endogenous. Equations (11) and (12) de¯ne the job ¯nding rate
and the job ¯lling rate respectively which depends25 on the current productivity state y:





In this economy, the only source of °uctuations is the labor productivity shocks. The welfare
cost of °uctuation is therefore de¯ned relatively to a counterfactual economy in which labor
productivity remains at its average value.
3.1.1 The value functions
The worker's utility
De¯ne Uy and Wy to be the state contingent present value of an unemployed worker and an
employed worker26:
Uy = z + ¯f(1 ¡ p(µy))Ey[Uy0] + p(µy)Ey[Wy0]g (13)
25Throughout the paper the notation xy indicates that a variable x is a function of the aggregate productivity
level y and Ey is the expected value conditional on the current state y.
26For the sake of simplicity, we omit from these equations the disutility of working and not working, the lump-
sum tax ¯nancing the unemployment bene¯ts and the dividend paid by ¯rms to workers, as these variables are
assumed to be identical across individuals.
21Wy = wy + ¯f(1 ¡ s)Ey[Wy0] + sEy[Uy0]g (14)
The ¯rm's surplus
To hire workers, ¯rms must open vacancies at cost ·. The ¯rm's value of an un¯lled vacancy Vy
is given by:
Vy = ¡· + ¯fq(µy)Ey[Jy0] + (1 ¡ q(µy))Ey[Vy0]g (15)
with Jy the state contingent present value of a ¯lled job and q(µy) the probability of ¯lling a
vacancy conditionally on the productivity state y. When the job is ¯lled, the ¯rms operate with
a constant return to scale technology with labor as only input. Firms face labor productivity
shocks. The ¯rm's value of a job is given by:
Jy = y ¡ wy + ¯f(1 ¡ s)Ey[Jy0] + sEy[Vy0]g (16)
Free entry implies Vy = 0 for all y. Therefore, the job creation condition is:
· = ¯q(µy)Ey[Jy0] (17)
3.1.2 Aggregate consumption
Aggregate consumption is equal to the aggregate production net of the vacancy costs.
cy = y(1 ¡ u) ¡ · v (18)
Fluctuations may alter average consumption through average unemployment, in the same way
as in the reduced form analysis, but also by in°uencing average vacancies. More vacancies in
the °uctuating economy on average could increase the business cycle costs. In other words, the
business cycle costs may derive from the °uctuations of either production or hiring costs.
3.1.3 Equilibrium
The labor market equilibrium depends on the way the wage is determined in the economy.
Though our benchmark is the rigid wage model, we ¯rst present the traditional equilibrium
with a Nash-bargained °exible wage. It allows us to compare the non-linearities embedded in
these two equilibria.
Equilibrium with °exible wages.
When a worker and an employer meet, the expected surplus from trade is shared according to
the Nash bargaining solution. The joint surplus Sy is de¯ned by Sy = Wy+Jy¡Uy. The worker
gets a fraction ° of the surplus, with ° her bargaining power. The equilibrium with °exible
22wages is de¯ned by the job creation condition and the wage rule (equations (19) and (20)), plus










w(µy) = °(y + ·µy) + (1 ¡ °)z (20)
As Shimer (2005) points out, the adjustment of wages is responsible for the insensitivity of the la-
bor market tightness to the productivity shocks. It also makes the interplay of the non-linearities
in the model more complex relative to the rigid wage equilibrium, due to the retroaction of wages
in the job creation condition (equation (19)).
Equilibrium with rigid wages
Incorporating wage rigidity in the matching model is a natural way to generate enough volatility.
Moreover, this allows us to focus on the basic non-linearities introduced by the matching function
which exist whatever the matching model considered.
Following Hall (2005), we consider a constant wage wy = w, 8y. This constant wage is an
equilibrium solution if z · w · min¼y, where ¼y denotes the annuity value of the expected
pro¯t27. The wage is set at the Nash bargaining solution relative to the average state of pro-
ductivity ¹ y. This wage is an equilibrium wage provided it lies in the bargaining set de¯ned by
the participation constraints of the ¯rms and the workers.
The rigid wage equilibrium is then de¯ned by substituting equations (19) and (20) by equations










w = °(¹ y + ·µ¹ y) + (1 ¡ °)z (22)
Let us comment on these equations regarding the non-linearities they incorporate. The non-
linearity arising from the unemployment dynamics (equation (10)) has been intensively inves-
tigated in the previous section. Let us concentrate here on the additional non-linearity that
appears once p is endogenous.
First of all, the job ¯nding rate depends non-linearly on the labor market tightness (equation
(11)): due to congestion e®ects, the return of an additional vacancy to the job ¯nding rate is
decreasing. This implies an asymmetric adjustment in the job ¯nding rate over the business
cycle. The average job ¯nding rate in the stabilized economy is potentially higher than in a
27This annuity value is simply computed using the value an employer attaches to a new hired worker who never
receives any wage:
e Jy = y + ¯(1 ¡ s)Ey[ e Jy0]
The annuity value is then given by ¼y = [1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)] e Jy.
23economy with business cycles, which tends to create higher business cycle costs (p-concavity
e®ect).
Secondly, equation (21), combined with the job ¯lling rate condition (equation (12)), shows
that the average labor market tightness could also be a®ected by productivity °uctuations. If
expansions and recessions have the same marginal impact on the ¯rm's pro¯ts, the free entry
condition is satis¯ed for greater variations in job creation in booms than in recessions. This
e®ect tends to increase the average job ¯nding rate in the stabilized economy, and thus leads
to lower business cycle costs (µ-convexity e®ect). Let us note that the °exible wage equilibrium
embodies the same non-linearity when abstracting from the wage retroaction.
The total impact of productivity °uctuations on the job ¯nding rate is then the combination of
these two e®ects (p-concavity and µ-convexity). From equations (11) and (12), it appears clearly
that the overall e®ect depends on the elasticity ® of the matching function to vacancies.
These basic non-linearities, embedded in the matching process, are common to the whole
Mortensen-Pissarides class of model. It is obvious that the °exible and rigid wage equilibria
share the same fundamental non-linearities, as they stem from the intrinsic characteristics of
the unemployment dynamics, of the job ¯nding rate and of the job ¯lling rate which are ex-
actly the same in the two equilibria. However, in the °exible wage case, the µ-convexity e®ect
is modi¯ed by the retroaction of the wage in the job creation condition (equations (19) and
(20)). Hence, the non-linearity between y and µy also depends on the assumption about the
wage bargaining process, and more generally on the particular assumptions considered, such as
the existence or not of ¯xed hiring and separation costs28. In this sense, the °exible wage equi-
librium introduces non-linearities which are not intrinsic to the matching process. As already
mentioned, the use of the rigid wage framework allows us to focus on basic non-linearities which
are common to a large class of model.
3.2 Quantifying the business cycles costs
We ¯rst calibrate the rigid wage economy. We then simulate the model in order to compute the
business cycle costs.
3.2.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated to match US data. We normalize average labor productivity to 1 and
calibrate the productivity process to match the US labor productivity standard deviation and
persistence29. The monthly discount rate is set to 0.0042. The job separation rate is set at Hall's
28See the last section for more details on this point.
29We use the same data as Shimer (2005), the real output per worker in the non farm business sector, detrended
with a HP smoothing parameter of 10
5.
24estimate for the US economy, 0.031. We choose the elasticity of the matching function ® to be
0.5, in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) range. Following Mortensen and Pissarides (1999),
° is set at 0.5. The scale of the matching function ' is chosen to pin down the US average
vacancy-unemployment ratio. Unemployment bene¯ts and vacancy costs are then calibrated to
reproduce the volatility and the mean of the job ¯nding rate over the cycle. These two targets
are computed using Hall (2005)'s measure of the job ¯nding rate (Table 1).




Persistence ½y 0.90 US data (1951-2003)
Standard deviation ¾y 0.9% US data (1951-2003)
Discount rate r 0.0042 Corresponds to 5% annually
Job destruction rate 0.031 Hall (2005)
Elasticity of the matching function ® 0.5 Petrongolo-Pissarides (2001)
Workers' bargaining power ° 0.5 Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)
Scale of the matching function ' 0.346 Matches US average v-u ratio of 0.72 (Pissarides, 2007)
Cost of vacancy · 0.239 Matches US average job ¯nding rate of 0.285 and job
¯nding rate volatility of 0.068 Unemployment bene¯ts z 0.796
3.3 Simulation
Table 7: The welfare cost of °uctuations in a matching model with rigid wages
Business cycles economy Stabilized economy Cost of
E(ut) E(pt) ¾p E(µ) ¹ u ¹ p ¹ µ °uctuations
® = 0:5 10.2% 0.285 0.069 0.72 9.82% 0.285 0.681 0.44%
® = 0:4 10.2% 0.285 0.069 0.72 9.75% 0.288 0.686 0.55%
® = 0:6 10.2% 0.285 0.069 0.72 9.89% 0.283 0.685 0.32%
Table 7, Line 1, presents the results for the benchmark calibration of the rigid wage model
following Hall (2005). These results show that the average unemployment rate is higher in the
°uctuating economy. This is also the case for the average labor market tightness, and so for
the average vacancies as well. Despite higher average vacancies, the welfare costs of °uctuations
induced by the structural model are identical to those obtained in the reduced form model.
Actually, the e®ect of higher vacancies on the business cycle costs appears to be negligible30.
30The increase in average vacancies has little impact on aggregate consumption because comparatively to
employment, vacancies do not weigh much in aggregate net production. First, the number of vacancies is small
25More striking is the absence of the in°uence of productivity °uctuations on the average job
¯nding rate. This result can be considered as disappointing since the endogenization of the
job ¯nding rate should potentially bring about other asymmetries: productivity shocks may
have non linear e®ects on the job ¯nding rate as the result of the two antagonist e®ects present
in the rigid wage equilibrium, namely the µ-convexity and p-concavity e®ects. To understand
this surprising neutrality, let us approximate the response of the job ¯nding rate using the
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The stabilization of labor productivity either decreases or increases the average job ¯nding rate,
depending on the value of the elasticity of the matching function ®. The job ¯nding rate is a
concave (convex) function of labour productivity if ® is below (above) 1=2 and the stabilized job
¯nding rate is then higher (lower) relatively to that of the volatile economy. In the benchmark
calibration with ® = 1=2, the µ-convexity and the p-concavity e®ects exactly compensate each
other.
In order to illustrate this non-linearity and its magnitude, we then simulate two other cases:
® = 0:4 and ® = 0:6 (last two lines of Table 7). The values of the parameters · and z have been
changed accordingly in order to still match the job ¯nding rate characteristics32. Depending on
®, the US welfare cost of °uctuations could reach 0.55% or reduce to 0.30%. Petrongolo and
Pissarides (2001) estimate this elasticity to be between 0.3 and 0.5. This suggests that with
® = 0:5, our benchmark calibration gives a lower bound of the welfare costs of °uctuations. In the
more realistic case (® = 0:4), the average job ¯nding rate in the °uctuating economy is inferior
to the value which would be reached in the stabilized economy. The magnitude of the worsening
in the business cycle costs is quite sizable, since it represents a third of the impact of the job
¯nding rate's volatility and persistence. The internal mechanism of the matching model leads to
quite high business cycle costs. Note that it occurs only when the labor market tightness µ (and
so the job ¯nding rate p(µ)) is volatile enough to make the non-linearity operating. Replicating
the volatility of both the labor market tightness and the job ¯nding rate leads to sizable business
cycle costs through di®erent channels which are all at work in this structural model33.
compared to the number of employed workers (v = 8%n for the benchmark calibration). Secondly, the °ow cost
of vacancy · is estimated to be low relative to labor productivity (· = 0:239¹ y for the benchmark calibration)
31The comparative static of the model without aggregate shocks can be used to approximate the dynamic
stochastic model if the shocks are persistent enough. See Mortensen and Nagypal (2003) for more details.
32Note that, in the ® = 0:4 case, the rigid wage de¯ned at the median productivity is no longer in the bargaining
set. The wage is then ¯xed at its highest value ensuring that the ¯rm's value is still positive (w = argminy¼y).
33Note that the higher volatility implied by the un¯ltered job ¯nding rate process would lead to an even more
substantial business cycle cost in the (® = 0:4) case.
263.4 Non-linearities in a °exible wage economy: an illustration
Not only the non-linearity of the job ¯nding rate due to the matching function is not speci¯c
to the rigid wage economy, but the °exible wage case adds other sources of non-linearity which
depend on the speci¯cation of the matching model considered. The di®erent mechanisms at
work could modify the consequences of °uctuations on the average job ¯nding rate. It is not
possible to check this assertion in all cases of the °ourishing literature on the Shimer puzzle. Let
us illustrate this point by considering the Pissarides (2007) approach which is very close to the
canonical matching model34. It consists of introducing a ¯xed cost K of recruiting. It modi¯es
equation (15) as follows:
Vy = ¡· + ¯fq(µy)Ey(Jy0 ¡ K) + (1 ¡ q(µy))EyVy0g
The key point is that it makes the vacancy cost less dependent on the labor market tightness.
In the traditional framework, following a positive productivity shock, tightness increases, and
so it increases the vacancy cost, which puts a brake on the expansion of the job ¯nding rate. In
that case, when considering insider wage contracts, the equilibrium is de¯ned by35:
·
q(µy)
+ K = ¯Ey
·





w(µy) = °(y + ·µy + ¯Kp(µy)) + (1 ¡ °)z
The additional non-linearity between y and µy, coming from the wage equation, results from
the consideration of a ¯xed hiring cost and an insider wage contract. This clearly illustrates
that additional non-linearities can be introduced in the matching model through alternative
assumptions, leading to higher or lower business cycle costs.
Appendix F shows that the condition which ensures that the job ¯nding rate is lowered by
business cycles is less stringent in this °exible wage environment. Wage adjustments modify
the response of vacancies to productivity shocks, which in turn alter the non-linearity in the job
¯nding rate. For the same value of ®, the °exible wage framework leads to a higher stabilized job
¯nding rate, and therefore to a higher cost of °uctuations. All in all, this result gives new impli-
cations to the Shimer puzzle literature: the way this puzzle is solved matters for the magnitude
of business cycles costs. The next question is then to determine the most empirically relevant
model which will then deliver the \realistic" magnitude of the costs generated by unemployment
°uctuations.
34Even closer, Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) have responded to the Shimer puzzle by suggesting that the
problem is more in the way the model is calibrated than in the model itself. They show that the volatility of the
job ¯nding rate is high only if the non-market activity z is calibrated su±ciently close to the average productivity.
The key point is the size of the percentage changes of pro¯ts in response to (productivity) shocks. Note that it
implies calibrating z at a much higher value than a strict interpretation as an unemployment bene¯t would imply.
This is not consistent with our assumption to not di®erentiate the disutility of working and of not working.
35Note that aggregate consumption (equation 18) is now: cy = y(1 ¡ u) + ·v ¡ K ¤ M(u;v).
274 Conclusion
This paper brings new insight to the business cycle cost analysis. It shows that non-linearities in
the unemployment dynamics caused by frictions on the labor market can generate sizable costs
of °uctuation. Using a reduced-form model of the labor market, these costs are estimated to
be almost two orders of magnitude greater than those of Lucas (1987). Our results emphasize
that the welfare cost of °uctuations does not only depend on the variability of aggregate shocks.
The persistence of these shocks, but also the level of structural unemployment have great impli-
cations. Furthermore, a high structural unemployment rate magni¯es the welfare consequences
of the volatility and the persistence of macroeconomic shocks. These ¯ndings extend to the
case where the job ¯nding rate is endogenized, provided the model is able to generate realistic
°uctuations in the job ¯nding rate. It could suggest that business cycles may reduce average
consumption by more in continental European countries which would then su®er from both
higher structural unemployment and more costly unemployment °uctuations. Business cycle
costs would not be alike across countries.
We also show in the rigid wage version µ a la Hall (2005) that the internal mechanisms of the
matching model matter for the magnitude of business cycle costs as they impact the average job
¯nding rate through di®erent non-linearities. It then remains to go further in the identi¯cation
of the factors at the origin of unemployment °uctuations. The answer to this question is also
important for stabilization policies. In this paper, nothing is said about the design and the
e±ciency of stabilization policies. It can be argued that the business cycle cost gives an upper
bound of the bene¯ts of stabilization policies and we agree that the cost of °uctuations and
the bene¯ts of stabilization policies must be distinguished, even if they are closely connected.
An estimation of stabilization policy presupposes a view of the type of shocks that a®ect the
economy, of the way they a®ect it, but also of the amount of variability that stabilization
policies can (or should) remove. As is standard in the matching literature, we assumed that
labor productivity shocks are the only source of °uctuations. Considering other shocks could
bring about di®erent non-linearities, and induce di®erent interactions with the job ¯nding rate
volatility. This question is left for further research.
We neglect in this paper several dimensions strongly related to unemployment, which could
have changed our quantitative measure of the business cycle costs. First, employment is not
considered as providing extra welfare disutility relative to unemployment. This question is
highly debated among the profession. Without any doubt, our choice increases the magnitude
of business cycle costs. On the other hand, unemployment bene¯ts do not lead to distortive
taxation in our theoretical framework. Business cycles, by increasing average unemployment,
could imply higher taxes, which would, in turn, weigh employment down. This could have been
counted as a cost of the business cycles. Another dimension which could magnify these costs is
the loss of human capital generated by unemployment spells re°ected in the permanent decrease
28in wages observed in data. Is it compensated for by more intense human capital accumulation in
expansion? All these points would deserve to be addressed to obtain a more general assessment
of the welfare cost of unemployment °uctuations.
From a methodological standpoint, this paper pleads for not linearizing models of business cycles.
We show that the non-linearities embodied in the matching model lead to signi¯cant business
cycle costs. One may suspect that the intensive use of log-linearization in the DGSE approach is
misleading. This is the case for the labor market but it could be also the case for other markets.
A reappraisal of business cycle models on this basis would be a fruitful area for research.
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31A The unemployment asymmetry gap
The conditional steady state can be written as a function of the job ¯nding rate:
e ui = e u(pi)
Let ºi = pi ¡ ¹ p, the conditional unemployment rate is therefore:
e ui = e u(¹ p + ºi)
Because the unemployment rate is a convex function of the job ¯nding rate, volatility in the
job ¯nding rate a®ects average unemployment. The unemployment gap Ãp between an economy
characterized by a stable job ¯nding rate and an economy with a volatile job ¯nding rate can
be computed as follows:
X
i
¼ie u(¹ p + ºi) = ¹ u + Ãp





















(¹ s + ¹ p)3









(¹ s + ¹ p)3
32B Average unemployment: analytical results
The unemployment dynamics read:
ut+1 = s + (1 ¡ s ¡ pt)ut (23)
De¯ne Át ´ 1 ¡ ¹ s ¡ pt and E[Á] ´ ¹ Á = 1 ¡ ¹ s ¡ ¹ p.





t is the innovation of the job ¯nding rate process. It is iid, has mean zero and variance
¾2
"p.
The unemployment dynamics can be written:
ut+1 = ¹ s + Átut (24)
A backward substitution gives:

















We can write Á in¯nite moving average representation:





And the mean of unemployment can be written as:
E[u] = ¹ s
³
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Which can be approximated by:
E[u] ¼ ¹ s
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A similar calculation gives the consequences of job separation rate °uctuations on the average
unemployment rate:
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33C Job ¯nding rate and separation rate data
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D Alternative speci¯cation: log-normal shocks
We estimate the following AR(1) processes:
ln(pt) = alp + ½lpln(pt¡1) + "
lp
t (25)
ln(st) = as + ½lsln(st¡1) + "ls
t (26)
Table 8 and 9 shows that the implied characteristics for the level of p and s are relatively close
to those displayed in Tables 1 and 2. This is particularly the case when considering H-P ¯ltered
data. Using the HP ¯lter makes the choice of estimating in log or in level pointless. On the other
hand, without ¯ltering, it appears that the log-linearity decreases the cost of business cycles.
As the distribution of p is shifted to the right, the non-linear e®ect of the °uctuations in p on u
is weaker: p °uctuates over a less convex region (Figure 11).




Table 8: Job ¯nding rate °uctuations under log-normality
Hall data Shimer data
Raw Detrended Raw Detrended
Estimated process of ln(p)
Standard deviation of "lp 0.098 0.097 0.049 0.048
Autocorrelation ½lp 0.941 0.913 0.941 0.914
Implied dynamics of p
Mean ¹ p 0.285 0.450
Standard deviation ¾p 0.084 0.068 0.068 0.053
Autocorrelation 0.942 0.913 0.939 0.915
Business cycle cost 0.63% 0.43% 0.13% 0.08%
Note: Quarterly average of monthly data. Sample covers 1948q3-2004q3 for Hall
(2005) and 1951q1-2003q4 for Shimer (2005). Following Shimer (2005), both sets of
data are detrended with a HP smoothing parameter of 105.
E Non linearities in the endogenous job ¯nding rate: the rigid
wage case
This Appendix gives the condition, for a rigid wage economy, under which the average job ¯nding
rate is higher in the volatile economy than in the stabilized economy. Following Shimer (2005)
and Mortensen and Nagypal (2003), we approximate the response of the job ¯nding rate in the
dynamic stochastic model using the comparative statics of the model without aggregate shocks.
The expected surplus from a ¯lled job can then be written simply as:
Jy = y ¡ ¹ w + ¯(1 ¡ s)Jy
And the free entry condition:
¡· + ¯q(µy)Jy = 0
36Table 9: Job separation rate °uctuations under log-normality
Hall data Shimer data
Raw Detrended Raw Detrended
Estimated process of ln(s)
Standard deviation of "ls 0.005 0.004 0.055 0.051
Autocorrelation ½ls 0.970 0.873 0.941 0.734
Implied dynamics of s
Mean ¹ s 0.031 0.034
Standard deviation¾s £10¡2 0.058 0.029 0.540 0.260
Autocorrelation 0.970 0.873 0.946 0.734
Business cycle cost 0% 0% -0.006% 0%
Note: Quarterly average of monthly data. Sample covers 1948q3-2004q3 for Hall
(2005) and 1951q1-2003q4 for Shimer (2005). Following Shimer (2005), both data are





y ¡ ¹ w
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)
As q(µy) = µ¡1+®






y ¡ ¹ w








y ¡ ¹ w
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)
¸ ®
1¡®
The stabilisation of the productivity process a®ects the job ¯nding rate in a non linear fashion.
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The job ¯nding rate is a concave function of labor productivity if ® < 1=2. In this case,
stabilizing the process of labor productivity increases the average job ¯nding rate.
37F Non linearities in the endogenous job ¯nding rate: the °exible
wage case
In this Appendix, we show that the condition ensuring the concavity of the job ¯nding rate is
less stringent when wages are °exible than when wages are rigid. As in Appendix E, we use the
comparative statics of the model without aggregate shocks to approximate the response of the
job ¯nding rate.
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The second-order derivative of p(y) can then be written:
@2p
@y2 = ®(1 ¡ ®)
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The job ¯nding rate is a concave function of productivity if:
@2p
@y2(®) < 0
¡µ®¡2[·(1 ¡ ®)µ¡® + ¹ ª°· + ¹ ª°¯K®µ®¡1] + ®µ¡2[· + ¹ ª°¯Kµ2®¡1] < 0
¡·(1 ¡ ®)µ¡2 ¡ ¹ ª°·µ®¡2 + ®µ¡2· < 0
This condition can be rewritten:
G(®) ´ 2® ¡ 1 ¡
¯
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)
°µ® < 0
If ® = 1=2, then:
G(1=2) ´ ¡
¯
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ s)
°µ1=2 < 0
The job ¯nding rate is a strictly concave function of productivity when ® = 1=2 (i.e at the
rigid wage threshold). Because 2® ¡ 1 < 0 for ® < 1=2, this restriction is also satis¯ed for any
® 2 [0;1=2]. Then, we deduce that the concavity of the job ¯nding rate is more probable in the
case of °exible wages.
38